South Carolina Law Review
Volume 52

Issue 2

Article 6

Winter 2001

Stigma Damages: Defining the Appropriate Balance Between Full
Compensation and Reasonable Certainty
Jennifer L. Young

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jennifer L. Young, Stigma Damages: Defining the Appropriate Balance Between Full Compensation and
Reasonable Certainty, 52 S. C. L. Rev. 409 (2001).

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Young: Stigma Damages: Defining the Appropriate Balance Between Full Com

STIGMA DAMAGES: DEFINING THE APPROPRIATE
BALANCE BETWEEN FULL COMPENSATION AND
REASONABLE CERTAINTY
I.

INTRODUCTION

Consider the following scenario: You own property situated near a gas station.
Some of the gas station's underground storage tanks leak, dispersing gasoline on
and around your property. The gas station owner begins remediation efforts, and
eventually all of the gasoline is removed from your property. However, despite full
remediation, you and your neighbors have experienced a diminution in property
value. Buyers are afraid to purchase your formerly contaminated property, and this
fear has reduced the value of your property. Your property has been stigmatized.
In the past fifteen years, plaintiffs have increasingly sought to recover damages
for the diminution in their property value caused by stigma.' While the vast majority
of stigma damage claims arise from contamination cases based on common law
trespass or nuisance theories, courts have addressed the issue of stigma damages in
cases regarding CERCLA,2 defective construction,3 termite damage,4 and deceptive

1. See Alex Geisinger, Nothing but Fearltself: A Social-PsychologicalModel ofStigma Harm
and Its Legal Implications,76 NEB. L. RaV. 452,457 (1997).
2. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1994); see Scribner v. Summers, 138 F.3d 471, 473 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting uncertainty
of New York law on stigma damage and expressing desire to certify question to state court); In re Paoli
R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 798 (3d Cir. 1994) (formulating three-part test for recovery of
stigma damages); Berryv. Armstrong Rubber Co., 989 F.2d 822,829 (5th Cir. 1993) (denying recovery
of stigma damages in the absence of physical harm to the property); Rhodes v. County of Darlington,
833 F. Supp. 1163, 1180 (D.S.C. 1992) (holding that property damage is not a "response cost" under
CERCLA).
3. See Aas v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 581, 604-05 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding petitioner's
claim for stigma damages generic and speculative where petitioner offered evidence that homes with
construction defects generally suffer a 2.8% decrease in value); McAlonan v. United States Home
Corp., 724 P.2d 78, 79 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (affirming lower court's jury instruction to award
damages for "the reasonable cost of repairing the property, together with the decrease in market value,
if any,. . .as repaired"); Pelletier v. Pelletier Dev. Co., No. CV 940463671 S, 1996 WL 166675, at *5
(Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 1996) ("[T]he proper measure of damages is cost ofrepair plus the 'stigma'
factor."); Anderson v. Bauer, 681 P.2d 1316, 1324 (Wyo. 1984) (awarding damages for diminution in
value caused by public awareness of water damage of the property).
4. See Horsch v. Terminix Int'l Co., 865 P.2d 1044, 1049 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming lower
court's award of damages for diminution in property value based on stigma of termite damage); Tudor
Chateau Creole Apts. P'ship v. D.A. Exterminating Co., 691 So. 2d 1259, 1265 (La. Ct. App. 1997)
(affirming trial court's award of damages for both cost of repairs and diminution in value and
acknowledging that "the total structural damage to the property is unknown" and "must, by law, be
passed on to any purchaser"); Terminix Int'l, Inc. v. Lucci, 670 S.W.2d 657, 663-64 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984) (affirming lower court's award of damages for cost of repair and diminution in value based on
evidence proving "the difficulty of ascertaining the extent of the termite damage, the tendency of
termites to revive and return to their scene of harm and the general bad reputation of termites to survive
and eat more").
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trade practices.' The variety of claims, along with the often uncertain nature of
stigma damage, has led to diverse and often confusing jurisprudence. Struggling
with the desire to make the plaintiff whole6 while awarding only those damages that
are proven with reasonable certainty,7 different jurisdictions have fashioned a
variety of rules on which to base the award of stigma damages. While most
jurisdictions agree that plaintiffs must experience some physical injury to their
property before they may recover stigma damages,' jurisdictions are divided on
whether the injury must be temporary or permanent. South Carolina only recently
addressed the issue ofpermanency in Yadkin Brick Co. v. MaterialsRecovery Co.9
Critics argue that stigma damages should not be awarded because they are
based on public perceptions, which can change at any time."0 However, stigmatized
property suffers a diminution in value for which the owner should be compensated.
The ideal rule for stigma damages must address both of these concerns. This
Comment explores the courts' treatment of stigma damages in different
jurisdictions, paying particular attention to the conflicting goals of fully
compensating the plaintiff for her injury while only awarding those damages that
can be proven with reasonable certainty. Part I[ examines the two dominant trends

5. See Pelletier,1996 WL 166675, at *7 (rejecting deceptive trade practices claim but awarding
cost of repairplus "'stigma' factor" forbreach ofconstruction contract); Smith v. Levine, 911 S.W.2d
427,434 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (affirming the lower court's award of damages for the stigma attached
to a defective foundation in a claim based on the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act).
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 cmt. a (1979) ("[T]he law of torts attempts
primarily to put an injured person in a position as nearly as possible equivalent to his position prior to
the tort.").
7. See id. § 912 (providing that an injured party is entitled to damages only if"he establishes by
proof the extent of the harm and the amount of money representing adequate compensation with as
much certainty as the nature of the tort and the circumstances permit"). The Second Restatement
further states that "[i]t is desirable... that there be definiteness ofproof of the amount of damage as
far as is reasonably possible." Id. at cmt. a.
8. But see In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig., 909 F. Supp. 991, 996-97 (D.V.I. 1995)
(holding that Virgin Islands law does not require physical harm to real property in order to recover
damages based on nuisance); Acadian Heritage Realty, Inc. v. City ofLafayette, 446 So. 2d 375, 379
(La. Ct. App. 1984) (allowing stigma damage recovery for the mere existence of a landfill operated
adjacent to property plaintiffs intended to develop as a subdivision).
9. 339 S.C. 640, 647-48, 529 S.E.2d 764,768 (Ct. App. 2000).
10. See E. Jean Johnson, Environmental Stigma Damages: Speculative Damages in
Environmental Tort Cases, 15 UCLA J. ENvTL. L. & POL'y 185, 193-95 (1997) (noting that "a
defendant's liability for stigma damages depends solely upon what the public perceives, no matter how
inaccurate or unreasonable theperceptions" and attributing public misperception to media coverage and
lack of education on environmental matters); see also Anthony Vale & Joanna Cline, Stigma and
Property Contamination-DamnumAbsque Injuria,33 TORT & INS. L.J. 835, 836 (1998) (listing
multiple factors that affect the value of stigmatized property such as "the level offear generated among
the public; the prognosis for the site; public perception of the person or entity responsible for [the
damage]; the visibility of the problem; and the actual degree of danger... implicated by significant
contract with a particular parcer); Eric S. Schlichter, Comment, Stigma Damages in Environmental
ContaminationCases: A Possible WindfallforPlaintiffs?,34HOUS.L.REV. 1125,1 152 (1997) ("The
impact ofstigma on property values changes 'overtime as publicity levels and information flows' shape
the public perception of the problem." (citation omitted)).
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the courts have followed in awarding stigma damages. Part III examines the limited
treatment of stigma damages in South Carolina. Part IV recommends a rule that
South Carolina courts should follow as the growth in stigma damage claims
necessitates a more refined holding to manage the opposing goals of full
compensation and reasonable certainty.
I1. DEFINING THE BOuNDARiEs FOR RECOVERY

A. Santa Fe Partnership: No Recovery in the Absence ofPermanentDamage
Several jurisdictions have addressed the issues of certainty and causation by
requiring proofofpermanent physical injury before a landowner can recover stigma
damages." These jurisdictions have held fast to the traditional damage rule allowing
recovery for diminution in value for permanent injury to property and repair costs
for temporary injury to property. Unfortunately, stigma damage is difficult to
categorize as permanent or temporary. Often, the physical injury to the property is
temporary, but the stigma remains even after full remediation. In such a situation,
the traditional rule is inflexible and undercompensating.
The California Court of Appeals faced this situation in Santa Fe Partnership
v. ARCO Products Co." In this case, the property owner, Santa Fe Partnership,
appealed the lower court's judgment in favor of ARCO, an oil company. 3 ARCO's
underground storage tanks, located adjacent to Santa Fe Partnership's property,
leaked gasoline into the soil and groundwater.' 4 Testing showed that the leak

I . See Bradley v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 130 F.3d 168, 176 (5th Cir. 1997) ("The requirements
of permanent and physical injury to property ensure that this remedy does not open the floodgates of
litigation by every property owner who believes that a neighbor's use will injure his property.");
Bartleson v. United States, 96 F.3d 1270, 1275 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Damages for diminution in property
value due to stigma have been recognized by the California courts in cases of permanent nuisance.");
Mehlenbacherv. Akzo Nobel Salt, Inc., 71 F. Supp. 2d 179,188 (W.D.N.Y. 1999) ("In order to recover
damages for diminution in value.... property owners must show.., that their property has been
physically damaged, or that their use and enjoyment of their property has been unreasonably interfered
with... and... either that the trespass or nuisance thus created cannot be fully remediated, or that the
cost of remediation would exceed the amount by which the value of the property has been
diminished."); Ruddv. Electrolux Corp., 982 F. Supp. 355,372 (M.D.N.C. 1997) (holding that "stigma
damages are not permitted unless the nuisance is classified as permanent.. ."); Santa Fe P'ship v.
ARCO Prods. Co., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 214,214 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (denying recovery for diminution
in value based on theory of continuing nuisance); Stevinson v. Deffenbaugh Indus., Inc., 870 S.W.2d
851, 856 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that landowner's action for temporary nuisance barred claim
for stigma damages, which are available only in an action for permanent nuisance); Yadkin Brick Co.
v. Materials Recovery Co., 339 S.C. 640, 647, 529 S.E.2d 764, 768 (Ct. App. 2000) (affirming a
directed verdict denying stigma damages because ofa failure to show permanent injury to the property).
12. 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d214, 217 (Ct. App. 1996), review denied,1996 Cal. LEXIS 5727, at*1 (Cal.
Oct. 2, 1996).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 214.
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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contaminated Santa Fe Partnership's property.'" Santa Fe Partnership contracted to
sell the contaminated property, but the buyer, upon learning of the contamination,
rescinded the contract. 6 Santa Fe Partnership brought suit against ARCO based on
theories of continuing trespass and continuing nuisance. 7 "Rather than proceed to
trial, the parties stipulated to entry of judgment in ARCO's favor in order to
immediately seek review in [the appellate] court to request an extension of the law
which would entitle [Santa Fe Partnership] to recover damages for diminution in
value on a theory of continuing trespass or nuisance."' 8
In reviewing the case, the appellate court followed the rule expounded by the
California Supreme Court holding that "a plaintiff-landowner cannot recover
damages for... diminution in value, in a case where the nuisance is deemed to be
continuing and abatable."' 9 The court relied on the California Supreme Court's
holding in Spauldingv. Cameron2" that a plaintiff could not recover for depreciation
in value for an abatable nuisance, because the "[p]laintiff would obtain a double
recovery if she could recover for the depreciation in value and also have the cause
of that depreciation removed."'" The court acknowledged Santa Fe Partnership's
argument that while their injury was not permanent, its effects would be realized for
a long time.22 Furthermore, the court agreed that the current state of the law did not
adequately address Santa Fe Partnership's condition:
Appellants acknowledge the current state of California law.
However they claim the concept [that] property reverts to its precontamination value once the contamination is remediated does
not conform to market realities. They claim remediation may take
as long as 20 years, or more in some cases. In these situations it is
difficult, if not impossible, to sell or secure a loan against the land
due to the stigma which attaches to previously contaminated
property. They argue this prevents a land speculator or investor
from realizing his or her profit, and, because investment moneys
are locked up in the contaminated property, prevents such persons
from using that investment money for other projects. Appellants
therefore request this court to "overrule" existing law and allow
"stigma" damages as a proper remedy for a continuing nuisance
caused by chemical pollution of the land.
15. Id. at 216.
16. Id.
17. Id. Santa Fe Partnership's claims forpermanent nuisance and permanent trespass were barred
by the statute of limitations. Id. at 224. The statute of limitations also barred Santa Fe Partnership's
claims for negligence and strict liability. Id. at 216.
18. Santa FeP'ship,54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 217.
19. Id. at218.
20. 239 P.2d 625 (Cal. 1952).
21. Id. at 629.
22. Santa Fe P'ship,54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 220.
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We acknowledge the logic and general appeal of this
argument ....
However, this court does not write on a clean
slate.... [W]e are bound to follow and apply the decisions of our
highest court, which expressly disallow prospective damages in
23
cases of continuing nuisance.
In the case of an abatable nuisance, the injured party is expected to "bring
successive actions for damages until the nuisance has been abated."24 The California
Court of Appeals noted that "[i]t is cumbersome, inefficient and contrary to the goal
of efficient legal remedies to bring numerous and successive suits during the period
[of contamination]."s In denying Santa Fe Partnership's claim for stigma damages,
the court admitted that its decision "may appear to be a harsh result. '26 However,
the court noted that it was bound by the precedent set by the California Supreme
Court. 27 The California Supreme Court denied review.28
Had Santa Fe Partnership been able to bring claims for permanent nuisance and
permanent trespass, the court most likely would have awarded damages for
diminution in value, and the stigma would have been factored in when calculating
the amount of damages.29 While California's decision not to award stigma damages
absent permanent physical injury is rigid, the California courts do allow injured
landowners some flexibility by allowing them to opt for a permanent nuisance
action in the instance that the nuisance, while abatable, will last for an indefinite
period."0 This option was unavailable to Santa Fe Partnership because of the statute
of limitations.31
Several jurisdictions follow California's rule. 2 However, Pennsylvania applies
a much more flexible rule, allowing the landowner to recover stigma damages for
temporary physical injury to property when there is an ongoing threat of future
33
injury.

23. Id. (footnote omitted).
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 219 (quoting Phillips v. City of Pasadena, 162 P.2d 625, 626-27 (Cal. 1945)).
Id. at 223.
Id. at 224.
Id.
Santa Fe P'ship v. ARCO Prods. Co., 1996 Cal. LEXIS 5727, at *1 (Cal. Oct. 2, 1996).

29. See Bartleson v. United States, 96 F.3d 1270, 1276 (9th Cir. 1996) (allowing landowners to
opt for a permanent nuisance action where a continuing possibility existed that shells from adjacent
military base would land on landowner's property).
30. See Spaulding v. Cameron, 239 P.2d 625, 627-28 (Cal. 1952). The Spauldingcourt noted that
in some situations, such as with a public utility, the nuisance or trespass is necessary and indefinite.
"Accordingly, it was recognized that some types ofnuisances should be considered permanent, and in
such cases recovery of past and anticipated future damages were [sic] allowed in one action." Id. at
627.
31. Santa Fe P'ship,54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 224.
32. See supra note 11.
33. See In re Paoli RtR. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 798 (3d Cir. 1994) (formulating three-part
test for recovery of stigma damages).
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B. Paoli: Stigma Damage Recovery for Temporary Physical Injury and
Ongoing Threat ofFutureInjury
In re PaoliRailroad Yard PCB Litigation 4 involved suits brought by thirtyeight persons35 living adjacent to the Paoli Railyard, "a railcar maintenance facility
at which polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) were used in profusion for over a
quarter century."3' 6 PCBs gradually accumulated in the railyard soil and eventually
leaked into the groundwater and soil of nearby residences.37 The plaintiffs in the
case were those identified by the Environmental Protection Agency as having
experienced the most severe contamination.38 "Many of the plaintiffs played in the
soil at their homes while growing up, gardened in it, and ate vegetables grown from
it. Many also regularly traversed the Yard on foot as a short cut to their
' The plaintiffs sought recovery for their physical injuries allegedly
destinations."39
caused by exposure to PCBs. 40 Additionally,
[s]ome plaintiffs... brought claims for emotional distress caused
by fear of future injury, and for medical monitoring to decrease
the likelihood of the future development of serious diseases.
Finally, some of the plaintiffs... brought claims for the decrease
in value to their property caused by the presence of PCBs on the
land.41
Because of the complexity ofthe Paolilitigation, this Comment will focus only on
the plaintiffs' claims for property damage caused by the presence of PCBs on their
property.
In the Paoli litigation, the plaintiffs' claims for stigma damages were first
addressed by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, which granted summary judgment for the defendants. 42 The court
abided by the traditional rule, holding that "[u]nder Pennsylvania law, the cost of
remediating harm to property is the exclusive measure of damages where the harm
' The court noted that damages for decreased market
is temporary and remediable."43
value are available only when the injury to the property is permanent."

34. 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994).
35. Id. at 735.
36. Id. at 732.
37. Id. at 734.

38. Id. at 735.
39. Id.
40. Inre PaoliR.R. Yard, 35 F.3d at 735.
41. Id.
42. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 811 F. Supp. 1071, 1077 (E.D. Pa. 1992), rev'd,35 F.3d
717 (3d Cir. 1994).
43. Id. at 1074.
44. Id.
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Furthermore, the court noted that under Pennsylvania law, "[t]here is a
presumption... that harm to property is temporary and remediable.... Permanent
damage has been found by the Pennsylvania courts in only the most extraordinary
situations."
Relying on Wade v. S.J Groves & Sons Co.,46 the plaintiffs argued that the
threat of future harm should be considered a "permanent harm" that would allow
recovery for the diminution in market value of their property.47 While not rejecting
Wade, the district court held that the plaintiffs "presented no evidence outside the
pleadings that any harm has ever been caused to [p]laintiffs' properties from the
alleged groundwater contamination or that it poses a future threat of harm." 48 The
court rejected the plaintiffs' evidence of stigma damage, holding that "[p]laintiffs
have failed to cite any authority which determines that decreases in property values
due to mere proximity to a site containing perceived hazardous chemicals is
compensable in Pennsylvania."49 The district court granted summary judgment for

the defendants.5 °
The landowners appealed, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
lower court's ruling.5' In its decision, the court of appeals departed from the
traditional rule awarding damages only in the face of permanent injury, noting that
the "appropriate measure of damages is generally defined as what is necessary to
compensate fully the plaintiff." 2
The court noted that the evidence indicated that even after remediation, a
human health hazard would still remain.53 Thus, the landowners would experience
an ongoing threat of future injury. In criticizing the traditional rule, the court stated:
This approach is normally consistent with the view that, when
physical damage is temporary, only repair costs are recoverable,
because in a perfectly functioning market, fully repaired property
will return to its former value. Thus, an award of repair costs will
be fully compensatory....

Hence, normally, it is only when

property cannot be repaired that courts must award damages for

45. Id. at 1075 (internal citation omitted).
46. 424 A.2d 902, 912 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (affirming trial court's decision to award damages

for diminution in value based on permanent change in drainage field on adjoining landowner's
property).
47. In re PaoliR.R. Yard, 811 F. Supp. at 1076.
48. Id.

49. Id. at 1076-77.
50. Id. at 1077.
51. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717,798 (3d Cir. 1994).
52. Id. at 797 (citing Wade v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 424 A.2d 902, 911-12 (Pa. Super. Ct.

1981)).
53. Id. at 796 ("[T]he EPA's own normal practice of cleaning up property to the point where the
risk is I in 1,000,000 creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a cancer risk of 1in 100,000
constitutes permanent damage .... ).
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diminution in value in order to fully compensate plaintiffs.
However, the market sometimes fails and repaircosts are not
fully compensatory. In such cases . . .plaintiffs should be
compensated for their remaining loss. Absent such an approach,
plaintiffs are permanently deprived of significant value without
any compensation. 4
The court condensed this analysis into a three-prong test to evaluate whether
plaintiffs can recover diminution inpropertyvalue absentpermanent physical injury
to their property. The court determined that plaintiffs may recover diminution in
value "where (1) defendants have caused some (temporary) physical damage to
plaintiffs' property; (2) plaintiffs demonstrate that repair of this damage will not
restore the value of the property to its prior level; and (3) plaintiffs show that there
is some ongoing risk to their land."55 The three-prong test addressed the concerns
of defendants' amicus, the American Insurance Association, which argued the
following:
[A]llowing a tort for diminution in value would allow thousands
of insubstantial and peripheral claims, would often grant
recoveries for routine fluctuations in market prices thus generating
windfalls, and would increase insurance costs, reduce the
availability of insurance, and reduce the availability of funds to
compensate those who were actually injured.56
The court responded by stating that the newly articulated rule would limit claims by
allowing recovery only when some physical harm to the owner's land has
occurred.57 It went on to explain that the requirement of physical harm would
preclude recovery in "cases such as the establishment of a group home for the
disabled."58 The court also rejected the floodgate argument noting that "[a]ny risk
of an avalanche of litigation ...will be prevented by the need of plaintiffs to
establish causation and to prove that the stigma associated with their land will
remain in place after any physical damage.., has been repaired."5 9 With this new
damage formulation, the appellate court reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment for the defendants on the stigma damage claims.6"
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 797-98 (citing Wade, 424 A.2d at 911-12) (emphasis added).
Id. at 798.
Id. at 798 n.64.
In re PaoliR.R. Yard, 35 F.3d at 798.

58. Id.

59. Id.
60. Id. at 798. On remand to the district court, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants on
all claims. In rePaoli R.R. Yard PCP Litig., 113 F.3d 444, 447 (3d Cir. 1997). The plaintiffs appealed
contending that the district court improperly instructed the jurors regarding the stigma damage claims.
Id.at 462. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the district judge erred in instructing the jurors that

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol52/iss2/6
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The Paoli formulation addresses the concerns mentioned by the court in Santa
Fe Partnership.61 The Paoli court fashioned a rule by synthesizing the traditional
awards for permanent and temporary injury. In the case of temporary injury, the
landowner must prove that two elements of permanent damage exist.62 The

landowner must prove both that remediation will not restore the property to its prior
value and that some ongoing risk to the property exists. 63 The last requirement

prevents recovery for misguided public perceptions.' That is, the court will award
stigma damages only when the stigma is warranted by an ongoing threat.
Paoli's three-pronged rule nicely addresses the contrasting goals of full
compensation and reasonable certainty of damages. Furthermore, the rule is more
efficient than the traditional rule, which requires that landowners suffering
temporary injury must bring successive suits for damages. 6' The Paoliapproach
also conforms to the measure of damages expounded by the Restatement (Second)

of Torts.6
M.

SOUTH CAROLINA: ADHERING TO TRADITION

A.

The Court's Early Treatment of Stigma Damage Claims

Stigma damages have received only limited attention from the South Carolina
courts. However, the few South Carolina stigma damage cases involving real
property follow the traditional approach, awarding diminution in value only when

there is permanent physical injury to the property.67 Interestingly, the South
Carolina courts first dealt with stigma damages in cases involving automobile

they must find "actual damage" to plaintiffs' property before the court could award stigma damages.
leL Plaintiffs argued that "actual damages" meant permanent damages. Id. at 462-63. The appellate
court affirmed the district court, holding that the jury instructions were proper, and that "after two
weeks of trial, the jury remained unconvinced of the most basic of plaintiffs' claims." Id. at 462-64.
61. 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 214, 220 (Ct. App. 1996).
62. In re PaoliR.R. Yard, 35 F.3d at 798.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 798 n.64.
65. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929 cmt. a (1979) ("In some cases the measure of
recovery may include an amount for depreciation in market value although there has been no substantial
physical harm .... ).
67. See Yadkin Brick Co. v. Materials Recovery Co., 339 S.C. 640, 647, 529 S.E.2d 764, 768
(Ct. App. 2000) (rejecting claim for diminution in value because of plaintiffs failure to prove
permanent injury to property).
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damage.6" The South Carolina courts were much more willing to award damages for
the diminution in value of a wrecked car than for injured real property.
In Coleman v. Levkoff 9 the South Carolina Supreme Court was faced with
determining the proper amount of damages to award the plaintiff, whose car was
damaged due to the defendant's negligence. After stating the traditional measure of
damages, the court held that if the repairs do not restore the market value of the
property before the injury then the proper amount of damages includes "the
difference in the market value of the property immediately before the injury and its
market value immediately thereafter, in its condition ofpartial restoration, together
with the reasonable cost of the repairs made and the value of the use of which the
owner was deprived.. .,2 0 Thus, the court acknowledged in its formulation of the
proper measure of damages that a car loses value after an accident even after the car
has been repaired.
In Newman v. Brown7 the court faced another automobile collision case in
which stigma damage was the main issue. The automobile owner's appraiser
testified about the stigma that attaches to an automobile once it has been in an
accident:
'A wrecked car is always a wrecked car, regardless of where you
carry it or try to trade it in, or anything else, it's a wrecked car.'
He further said that he did not want a wrecked car of any kind and
if it were his he would trade it [in] unrepaired, as it was worth
only the salvage value.72
The court cited Coleman v. Levkoff 3 as a "well considered case upon the measure
of damages to an automobile" and held that the proper measure of damages was the
cost of repairs plus any remaining diminution in value.74 The court noted that .'[a]
new car may be badly damaged and be repaired so as to put it in a sound or good
state, and yet be worth much less than before the collision."' 75

68. See Coleman v. Levkoff, 128 S.C. 487,491, 122 S.E. 875, 876 (1924) (acknowledging that
repairs may not restore a car to its pre-accident value); Newman v. Brown, 228 S.C. 472, 477, 90
S.E.2d 649, 652 (1955) (allowing for recovery of repair costs plus any remaining diminution in value);
Campbell v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 234 S.C. 572, 577, 109 S.E.2d 572, 577 (1959) (holding that where
repairs do not fully restore car to its pre-accident value, the owner is entitled to recover the diminution
in value).
69. 128 S.C. 487, 122 S.E. 875 (1924).
70. Id. at 491, 122 S.E. at 876.
71. 228 S.C. 472, 90 S.E.2d 649 (1955).
72. Id. at 475, 90 S.E.2d at 650.
73. 128 S.C. 487, 122 S.E. 875 (1924).
74. Newman, 228 S.C. at 476-77, 90 S.E.2d at 651-52.
75. Id.(quoting Littlejohnv. Elionsky, 36 A.2d 52, 53 (Conn. 1944)); see also Adams v. Orr, 260
S.C. 92, 99, 194 S.E.2d 232, 235 (1973) (holding that "the plaintiff was entitled to recover for loss of
use of the vehicle and for depreciation, which every wrecked vehicle experiences").
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Similarly, in Campbell v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co.,76 a case involving a
collision policy, the court noted that 'repair or replacement of broken or damaged
parts"' does not necessarily restore a car to its former condition unless the value of
the car after repair is not diminished."

B. The CourtAddresses Stigma Damagewith Respect to Real Property
In Gray v. Southern Facilities,Inc.7" the South Carolina Supreme Court finally
addressed, in a limited way, stigma damages with respect to real property. In Gray
a property owner brought suit against petroleum plant operators for pumping
gasoline into a creek adjacent to the landowner's property.79 The creek erupted into
fire, but did not cause physical damage to the landowner's property. However, a
real estate appraiser testified that the property value had diminished ten percent as
a result of the fire."' The appraiser gave the following testimony:
"Q. And you believe the property has been damaged because of
the fire, is that right?["]
"A. [I]t does not have any physical damage, actual physical
damage to the property but we are speaking of the damage to
the resale value to the piece of property.["]
"Q. Now, if there were no way for petroleum products to get into
this stream so there could be another fire there would be no
damage would there?["]
"A. I can't say that for this particular reason: you may abate the
possibility of petroleum products going into the stream, but it
is another thing to convince the public that this has been
done.["]
"Q. This is really a damage to the reputation of the property,
wouldn't you say... ?["]
"A. Yes, to a degree, that's correct.["]

"Q.If you went out there today there would be absolutely no
evidence that there had ever been a fire would there?["]
"A. No sir.["]

76.
77.
(1930).
78.
79.
80.
81.

234 S.C. 583, 109 S.E.2d 572 (1959).
Id. at 591, 109 S.E.2d at 576 (quoting Rossier v. Union Auto Ins. Co., 291 P. 498, 500
256 S.C. 558, 183 S.E.2d438 (1971).
Id. at 561, 183 S.E.2d at 439.
Id. at 561-62, 183 S.E.2d at 439.
Id. at 564, 183 S.E.2d at 440.
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"Q. So what you are talking about is damage that people have in
their minds because of a history of something that has
happened?["]
"A. Yes, sir.["]
"Q. And damage through fear82 that this might happen again?["]
"A. That's about it, yes, sir.",
The court noted the general rule that "'injury to the reputation of... property
has been held not to be a proper element of damages." 83 The court commented that
only a few courts in other jurisdictions had considered the issue, but that no general
rule had been developed.' The court declined to establish a rule of its own because
"[t]he evidence as to the diminution of market value is, in our view, speculative, not
only as to the amount but speculative as to the portion thereof proximately and
directly resulting from... the respondents." 5 The court decided that the landowner
failed to prove proximate cause because other petroleum plants were located in the
same area, and because these plants had also occasionally leaked gasoline into the
creek.86 Because the plaintifffailed to prove causation, the court declined to address
the stigma damage issue.87
In Yadkin Brick Co. v. MaterialsRecovery Co.8" the South Carolina Court of
Appeals took a more definitive stance in addressing stigma damages. 9 In Yadkin
the owner of abrickyard sued a chemical company that shipped hazardous materials
to the brickyard.9" The brickyard had received permission from North Carolina
environmental authorities allowing the brickyard "to incorporate defined
proportions of petroleum-contaminated soils into its brick-making process."'"
However, the sludge that the chemical company shipped to the brickyard was
contaminated with Dowtherm.9 2 The brickyard did not have authorization to process
or store Dowtherm.93 The brickyard sued for damages arguing that the presence of
Dowtherm diminished the value of the brickyard property.94 At the time of trial the
brickyard had been sold to a third party.95 The former brickyard owners offered the
reduced selling price as evidence of the diminution in value.96

82. Id. at 564-65, 183 S.E.2d at 440-41.

83. Id. at 569, 183 S.E.2d at443 (quoting22AM.JUR.2DfDanages § 136) (omission in original).
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Gray, 256 S.C. at 569-70, 183 S.E.2d at 443.
Id. at 571, 183 S.E.2d at 444.
Id. at 570, 183 S.E.2d at 444.
Id.
339 S.C. 640, 529 S.E.2d 764 (Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 646-48, 529 S.E.2d at 767-68.
Id. at 644, 529 S.E.2d at 766.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Yadkin, 339 S.C. at 644, 529 S.E.2d at 766.
Id. at 646-47, 529 S.E.2d at 767.
Id. at 646, 529 S.E.2d at 767.
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However, the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that this evidence did not
prove that the buyer "subtracted a certain sum because of the Dowtherm on the
property. ' ' 97 In affirming the trial court's directed verdict for the chemical company,
the South Carolina Court of Appeals relied heavily on Gray and adhered to the
traditional rule of damages.9" Quoting Gray,the court explained the general rule on
damages in South Carolina:
[I]n case of an injury of a permanent nature to real
property... the proper measure of damages is the diminution of
the market value by reason of th[e] injury, or in other words, the
difference between the value of the land before the injury and its
value after the injury. Where the pollution . . . results in a
temporary or nonpermanent injury to real property, the injured
landowner can recover the depreciation in the rental or usable
value of the property caused by the pollution.99
The appellate court held that the brickyard failed to establish a permanent injury to
the property, and thus diminution in value was not the proper measure of damages:
"There was no evidence presented to establish that damage to the property would
continue to exist once the cleanup was accomplished."'3 0
In response, the former brickyard owners argued a "novel theory of
permanency."' 0 ' The former owners contended that "since the property was sold
during the pendency of the action and... the sales price was depressed due to the
presence of the Dowtherm-contaminated soil, the damage to [the plaintiff] is
therefore permanent" because the former owners sold their property at a reduced
price.0 2 The appellate court rejected this argument holding that the brickyard "must
prove that the damage is permanent to the property," not to the plaintiff.'
Thus, the South Carolina Court of Appeals followed the same traditional,
inflexible rule that the Santa Fe Partnership court followed. However, it is
important to remember that in Gray the South Carolina Supreme Court refrained
from deciding the stigma damage issue because the plaintiff failed to prove
causation. However, in Yadkin the South Carolina Court of Appeals, rejecting the
stigma damage claim, relied on Gray despite the Gray court's decision not to
address the issue.

97. Id. at 647, 529 S.E.2d at 767.
98. Id. at 645-46, 529 S.E.2d at 767.
99. Id. (quoting Gray v. S. Facilities, Inc., 256 S.C. 558, 569, 183 S.E.2d 438, 443 (1971)
(alterations in original)).
100. Yadkin, 339 S.C. at 647, 529 S.E.2d at 768.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 647-48, 529 S.E.2d at 768.
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IV. THE FUTURE OF STIGMA DAMAGES N SOUTH CAROLNA

A. Paoli as a Model
As stigma damage claims continue to rise, South Carolina courts will need to
readdress and supplement the incomplete analyses offered by the Gray and Yadkin
courts. In doing so, the courts should look to Paolifor guidance to formulate a rule
that will address the opposing goals of full recovery and reasonable certainty.
Apart from the South Carolina automobile-wreck cases, South Carolina courts
have adhered to the traditional measure of damages for real property, awarding
diminution in value only when there is permanent physical injury."4 This traditional
measure ensures that the diminution in value is causally related to the physical
injury. Furthermore, the court faces less risk of overcompensating the plaintiff, and
the diminution in value is not as speculative when there is permanent damage to the
property. The court is not faced with the problem of awarding damages based on
misplaced public perceptions.
The traditional rule certainly does have some benefits. However, the Paolirule
manages to preserve these benefits while acknowledging the reality that public
perception does influence property value. By requiring actual physical injury to the
land, the Paolitest ensures that any stigma damage is causally related to the injury
caused by the defendant. The requirement that the plaintiff prove that remediation
will not restore the value of the property to its prior level protects against
overcompensating the plaintiff. Finally, the requirement that the plaintiff prove that
there is some ongoing risk to the propertyprotects against awarding damages based
on the public's unfounded fears and perceptions about the property. If the plaintiff
can prove that there will be a continuing risk, the negative public perception is
likely to remain consistent over time. The plaintiffwill not recover for the public's
fear that there will be another injury to the property, unless there actually is a proven
risk of further injury to the property.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 929 addresses recovery for harm to land
from past invasions.'0 5 Consider comment a of § 929:
In some cases the measure ofrecovery may include an amountfor
depreciation in market value although there has been no
substantialphysical harm, as when a test well is bored by a
trespasser and proved to be dry, and as a result the land loses its
value as an oil prospect. In this case the owner may be entitled to
substantial damages on the ground that although he is not entitled
to represent it as oil-bearing land after discovering that it is not, or
to insist on the silence of one who had acquired information of the

104. See id. at 645-46, 529 S.E.2d at 767.
105. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 929 (1979).
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truth without committing a trespass, he is entitled to have
the
10 6
aleatory character of his land protected against trespasses.
The foregoing example is analogous to property damage caused by remediable
contamination. The property owner will have to disclose to all future purchasers that
the property was once contaminated.' Thus, the price of the owner's property will
be reduced by the fears of prospective buyers that the property is still contaminated.
The Second Restatement example involves a trespasser who reveals an inherent
characteristic in the land, the knowledge of which makes the land less
valuable--namely, the absence of oil on the land. The Second Restatement allows
recovery because this knowledge is obtained by unlawful means.
An even stronger case for stigma damage recovery exists when the nuisance or
trespass occurs in the form of contamination. Not only is the nuisance or trespass
unlawful in itself, but, in the form of contamination, the nuisance or trespass causes
physical injury to the land. This type of injury is more severe than the example
offered by the Restatement (Second) of Torts. In the Second Restatement example,
the trespass did not cause physical injury to the land. Rather, the trespass merely
revealed the fact that the land was not suitable for drilling oil, the knowledge of
which decreased the value of the land. l08 Presumably, either the current owner or
a subsequent owner would eventually learn on her own that the land was not
suitable for drilling oil.
Contamination causes a more severe injury because not only is the
contamination itself a trespass or nuisance, but additionally, the contamination
actually injures the land. The Second Restatement anticipated the reality that the
Paolicourt acknowledged in its formulation of stigma damages: that real property
is subject to stigma and that this has an appreciable effect on the property's value. 109
B. Policy Considerations
Stigma damage reflects the reality that injury to real property is not necessarily
confined by boundary lines, nor does the injury necessarily disappear when the
source of the harm is remediated. Stigma damage represents the market's perception
of the decrease in property value caused by the injury to the property. This
perception is limited by the amount of reliable information available to the public
regarding the property in question."' When more information is available to the
106. Id. § 929 cmt. a (emphasis added).
107. See Timothy J. Muldowney & Kendall W. Harrison, Stigma Damages: PropertyDamage
and the FearofRisk, 62 DEF. CouNs. J. 525, 529 (1995) (noting that the advent of residential real
estate disclosure laws make "the climate for stigma damages claims very favorable").
108. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929 cmt. a (1979).
109. See id.; In re Paoli R.R Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 798 (3d Cir. 1994).
110. See Phillip S. Mitchell, EstimatingEconomic Damagesto Real PropertyDue to Loss of
Marketability,Rentability, andStigma, 68 APP1RAsALJ. 162, 163 (2000) (citing "[u]ncertainty due to
the lack of generally available, accurate market information concerning the property's current status"
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public about the property's condition, the stigma will more accurately represent the
actual decrease in value caused by the injury. When less information is available to
the public, the stigma will more likely be based on irrational fears.
This asymmetry ofinformation poses a problem for courts, which must address
claims for stigma damage based on both accurate information and irrational fears.
In formulating a rule to address stigma damage claims, the courts should consider
addressing the issue from a public policy standpoint. It is an economic reality that
real property may experience a diminution in value despite remediation. In
addressing stigma damage claims, the courts must decide whether to protect the
tortfeasor from liability for damages based on public perceptions, or whether to
compensate the innocent landowner for his property's diminution in value. That is,
should the plaintiff or the defendant bear the liability for the discrepancy between
what the property is actually worth and the value the market has attributed to the
1
property?
As a matter of public policy, the courts should consider that awarding stigma
damages can serve as an economic deterrent to property-damaging tortfeasors. 12 If
property-damaging tortfeasors are held liable for post-remediation stigma damages,
they will be forced to acknowledge the reality that remediation does not always
restore property values to their pre-injury value. In the contamination context,
stigma damage awards can act as an economic deterrent that can supplement
statutory regulation."'
V.

CONCLUSION

Currently, the South Carolina courts have only addressed stigma damage in a
limited way. In Gray v. SouthernFacilities,Inc. the South Carolina Supreme Court
declined to address the stigma damages issue because the plaintiffs failed to prove

as a cause of diminished marketability).
I 11. InAdkinsv. Thomas Solvent Co., 487N.W.2d715, 737 (Mich. 1992), a contamination case,
the dissent addressed this very question. Justice Levin, dissenting from the majority's denial of
plaintiffs' stigma damage claim, stated that "[p]rotecting polluters of the water supply against the
consequences of their conduct is not... an interest deserving ofjudicial indulgence."
112. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 901 (1979) (stating that one function of damages
in tort is to "deter wrongful conduct.").
113. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, TortLaw in theRegulatoryState, in TORTLAvANDTHE PUBLIC
INTEREST 80,86 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991) ("Ideally, tort law and regulatory standards work together
to further deterrence and compensation goals."). Rose-Ackerman notes three situations in which tort
law and statutory regulations can be complementary:
(1) when tort doctrines are stopgaps that apply absent more stringent statutes; (2)
when regulatory standards are intended as minima that more stringent tort
doctrines can supplement; and (3) when a regulatory standard is set at the socially
optimal level and tort doctrine imposes either strict liability or a standard ofcare
lower than that required by the agency.
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causation.'" 4 However, in Yadkin Brick Co. v. MaterialsRecovery Co. the South
Carolina Court of Appeals determined that diminution in value, and thus stigma
damage, is not an element of recovery in the absence of permanent damage to real
property." 5 The appellate court cited Gray despite the fact that the Gray court chose
not to address the stigma damage issue.' 1 6 Therefore the issue of stigma damages
is still unresolved in South Carolina.
Although the South Carolina Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue of
stigma damage, the issue is likely to appear before the court soon. The frequency
with which plaintiffs are seeking stigma damages in suits for injury to real property
is increasing. These suits do not involve only nuisance and trespass; they also
include suits for breach of pest control contracts, defective construction, deceptive
trade practices, and CERCLA. Stigma damage has also been an issue in the
increasingly litigious area of synthetic stucco." 7
The stigma damage rule developed by the Paolicourt is broad enough to cover
the different types of litigation under which stigma damages arise. Yet, the Paoli
rule is refined enough to manage the opposing goals of full compensation and
reasonable certainty. While not discussed by the Paoli court, the South Carolina
Supreme Court may consider that as a matter of public policy, awarding stigma
damages can also serve as an economic deterrent that will protect landowners from
property-damaging tortfeasors. The South Carolina Supreme Court should consider
Paolias the court seeks to formulate a rule on stigma damage that will fairly serve
both the defendants and the plaintiffs of South Carolina.
JenniferL. Young

114. 256 S.C. 558, 570, 183 S.E.2d 438,443-44 (1971).

115. 339 S.C. 640, 645-48, 529 S.E.2d 764, 767-68 (Ct. App. 2000).
116. Id. at 647-48, 529 S.E.2d at 768.
117. See In re Stucco Litig., 175 F.R.D. 210, 219 (E.D.N.C. 1997) (denying class certification
because plaintiffs asserted stigma damage when only some plaintiffs suffered physical damage to
property and because some plaintiffs lived in a region where synthetic stucco carries no stigma).
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